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The regulations in the 1979 Penal Code on bribery and other 
forms of corruption were too simple. Only four types of crime 
were defined: corruption, bribe-taking, bribery and brokerage 
bribery, with the first grouped under property encroachment 
and the other three under malfeasance or dereliction of duty. 
The 1988 Supplementary Regulations on Punishment jor Bribery and 
Other Corruption Crimes, promulgated by the NPC Standing 
Committee, had made major revisions and additions to the 
relevant regulations in the 1979 Penal Code and represented the 
first step in efforts to establish a fairly comprehensive system for 
defining bribery and other acts of corruption, including bribe- 
taking, bribery, embezzlement of public funds, unclear origin of 
huge assets and concealment of deposits abroad.
To meet the need to combat corruption and strengthen 
efforts to crack down on bribery and other forms of corruption, 
the highest legislative body originally planned to formulate a 
special normative anti-corruption and bribery document (the 
Anti-Corruption and Bribery Law) to be drafted by the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate. Proceeding from the principle 
of devising a unified, relatively complete, penal code, the 
current revision embraced the compilation of the Additional 
Regulations on Punishing Corruption and Bribery Crimes (adopted by 
the NPC Standing Committee in 1988) and the anti-corruption 
and bribery law (now being drafted by the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate) in a chapter in the specific provisions of the new 
penal code. New charges, such as illegal distribution of state- 
owned assets and illegal distribution of fines and confiscation 
were added and the anti-corruption and bribery criminal 
punishment norms made more effective and descriptive. The 
legislative body has incorporated the Draft Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on the Punishment of Servicemen 
for Anti-Duty Crimes, which was submitted by the Central 
Military Commission to the Standing Committee of the Eighth 
NPC for deliberations, into the new penal code as the final 
chapter of the Specific Principles, after making certain revisions
and additions. Such a measure has guaranteed the completeness 
of the new penal code system as well as the authenticity of its 
role and functions; it is also conducive to putting the army onto 
the modern rule-of-law track.
Thirdly, in compliance with the practical need for the criminal 
law to protect the healthy development of the market economy 
and to safeguard state and social stability under the social market 
economy, the new penal code has greatly strengthened the 
categories of charges. From the point of view of the crime 
categories in the chapters and articles covered, the new Specific 
Principles section has created a special chapter on crimes 
endangering national defence, besides adding a new chaptero o ' or
incorporating servicemen's offences and creating a separate 
chapter dealing with corruption and bribery. At the same time, 
it has substantiated and divided into eight sections the third 
chapter, which dealt with crimes disrupting the socialist market 
economy; and substantiated and divided into nine sections the 
sixth chapter, which dealt with crimes impeding social 
administration. The new penal code has added over 150 new 
charges besides retaining most of those in the 1979 Penal Code 
as well as others added later, bringing the number of offences in 
China's criminal law to a total of 413. Such crimes as organising, 
leading or joining terrorist organisations, hijacking ships or 
vehicles, are all new charges. The addition of new offences, 
relating to new categories of crime, has strengthened and 
modernised China's new penal code, which will help to bring 
about social development and prosperity.
Part Two of this article will be published in the next issue of Amicus 
Curiae. @
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Contingency fees entering the Dutch legal system
by Leny E de Groot-van Leeuwen
I n the Netherlands the wind blows from the west most of the time. Perhaps that is why the Dutch adopt so many legal features and procedures from the US, such as plea 
bargaining, alternative dispute resolution and contingency fees 
for attorneys. The discussion on contingency fees (or 'no cure, 
no pay' as the Dutch say) flared up recently, sparked by Attorney 
Mr G Engelgeer, who sued the Dutch Bar Association 
(Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten ('NOVA') for not allowing them.
According to this attorney, the restrictions the DBA imposes 
on competition among its members violate the national and 
European law. Mr Engelgeer grounds his complaints in a recently 
published set of 'points for consideration' from the Dutch 
Competition Authority (Nederlandse mededigingsautoriteit, 'NMa')
in which it is stated that the current prohibition on contingency 
fees should be banned.
The complaints against the NOVA have fallen on fertile soil. 
This soil has been prepared by the European Union, which views 
the Netherlands as a paradise for cartels. The EU has forced the 
NMa to adopt a strictly pro-competition stance, with the 
objective of pushing the Dutch style of conducting business in a 
more open-market direction (without sacrificing the Dutch 
culture of consensus, i.e. the much-praised 'polder model', to 
which the cartel-style of business is closely connected).
The NMa's view is only one stone in an avalanche of decisions 
pertaining to all other sectors of business. The relevance of the 
contingency fees case lies at a deeper level, in that, as far as the 31
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NMa is concerned, the attorney's activities are viewed as simply 
one type of business among others.
The traditional concept of the profession of attorney in the 
Netherlands is far removed from that of competitive market 
behaviour. Traditionally, attorneys were not supposed to visit 
their clients nor to advertise their services; they were expected 
to be independent of their clients and to exercise restraint if 
their client's interests conflicted with those of third parties or 
the public good. The attorney's remuneration was therefore 
considered as an 'honorary fee'. Obviously the present 
discussion has moved a long way from this original position.
EXISTING BILLING REGULATIONS
Contingency fees are more or less common practice in the US 
but not yet in Europe. In Germany, for instance, fixed fees 
according to the type of activity are common practice. The 
billing system in the Netherlands is still based on a fee per hour. 
Traditionally, the Dutch Bar used to set a fixed fee for all 
attorneys but this practice was dropped in 1997 under pressure 
from the pro-competition lobby.
Contingency fees are still prohibited, however. Rule 2 5 of the 
Code of Conduct of the Bar contains the following statements:
'(1) The attorney is not free to agree with a client to be remunerated 
only if the case has a certain result', and
(2) 'The attorney shall not agree with a client that the remuneration 
will consist of a certain proportion of the value of the result of the 
attorney's effort, except in categories of cases for which the Bar 
Association has advised a tariff.'
In current practice, this exception to the pars quota litis 
prohibition consists only of a debt-collecting commission, 
which can be agreed upon between the debt-collecting attorney 
and his client.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR
In the current discussions all arguments voiced in favour of 
contingency fees are based on the market-oriented paradigm. 
The NMa is against the restrictions of art. 25 because thev
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reduce competition and hence violate art. 6 of the Competition 
Act (Mededingingswet). This article prohibits:
' ... all agreements between companies, decisions of company 
associations and co-ordinated actions of companies aimed at or 
resulting in precluded, reduced or distorted competition.'
Besides this rather general argument, it is sometimes claimed 
that contingency fees will result in improved promotion of the 
client's interest because the attorney has a direct stake in 
winning the case and, contrary to the billing system, the 
attorney has an interest in dealing with the case as quickly as 
possible. Furthermore, the client does not need to spend time 
checking whether billed hours are actually worked.
The most important argument in favour, however, is that 
contingency fees result in improved access to justice, due to the 
fact that the financial consequences of litigation are shifted from 
the client to the attorney in exchange for a part of the spoils. 
This also shifts the decision to file a case to the one who is most 
competent, so that the number of hopeless cases will be 
reduced. Finally, it will also be easier for the client to compare 
the offers of different attorneys.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
Most arguments put forward against contingency fees are 
based on the image of the bar as a profession. One claim, for
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instance, is that the objective of art. 25 of the Code of Conduct 
is to protect the client and hence has nothing to do with a price 
agreement. The prohibition of pars quota litis guarantees the 
independence of the attorney and with that a proper execution 
of professional duties. The relationship of trust between 
attorney and client would suffer if the system of remuneration 
forced the attorney to look after his or her own financial 
interests during the development of a case. The relationship of 
trust between attorney and judge would deteriorate likewise.
Another consequence of contingency fees, as pointed out by 
the opponents, is that attorneys would direct their energies 
towards cases where big money can be found, such as injury 
cases. Consequently, energy spent on cases where justice, rather 
than money, is the issue would be reduced.
Many opponents of contingency fees refer to the attorney's 
duty always to aim for a peaceful settlement rather than 
continue in conflict mode to the very end (art. 3 of the code).
Opponents of contingency fees often refer to 'American 
conditions' as a spectre of the future if contingency fees were 
allowed. (This imagery includes ambulance chasing and 
outrageous claiming behaviour, but excludes, of course, lawyers 
billing more than 24 hours per day or dragging on with lost 
lawsuits only in order to raise the bill, as can happen under a 
non-contingency-fee system.)
A further argument against contingency fees is that they would 
reinforce the tendency to hunt other professionals, such as those 
in the medical system, with malpractice and similar suits, 
thereby greatly raising the cost of these systems (through 
insurance premiums, for example). The effect of the 
contingency fees would then be that the collective good of an 
accessible medical system wrould be undermined by a constant 
drain of money to the pockets of insurance companies, 
malpractice lawyers and 'lucky' individual clients.
THE FUTURE
The defenders of the traditional profession seem to be 
fighting a lost battle. In the longer run it would appear that, in 
modern societies, traditional ways of practice can survive only 
under a centralised 'pooling' system of remuneration, in which 
payments depend on clients and services only through a system 
operated above the level of the individual. Examples of the latter 
are the national health service and the Church; within these, at 
least in the Netherlands, doctors and the clergy survive as 
'undiluted' professions.
For professions outside that type of system   and the Bar in 
the Netherlands is one of these   the tensions between 
traditional values and the logic of the market appear too deep to 
allow for simple solution by mixing some of each. The current 
debate on contingency' fees, therefore, rather than ending in 
shallow compromise, should be seen as an opportunity to 
develop a new type of profession within the market. @
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